InvestMacro

By Liam Collins, United States Military Academy West Point 

With Russian troops digging trenches to prepare for an expected winter standoff, it would be easy to conclude that fighting will slow in Ukraine until after the ground thaws in the spring.

But evidence from the Ukrainian battlefields point to a different trajectory.

As a career U.S. special forces officer who conducted field research on the 2008 and 2014 wars in Georgia and Ukraine, it is my view that this war has demonstrated that only one side, the Ukrainians, can execute effective combat maneuvers. I believe that the Ukrainians will attempt to launch a large-scale counteroffensive in late winter when the ground is still frozen.

Winter’s impact on war

Historically, the pace of fighting does slow in the winter.

Weapons and other equipment can freeze up in extreme cold, and it’s much more difficult to shoot a weapon while wearing thick gloves.

Shorter days are a factor. Despite technological advances, most of the fighting during this war has occurred during the day.

But this winter may be different for the Ukrainian military.

First, Ukrainian winters are not nearly as cold and snowy as many believe.

Donetsk, for example, has an average temperature of nearly 25 degrees Fahrenheit (-4 degrees Celsius) in January and February.

Its snowiest month, January, averages only 4.9 inches of snow, or .12 meters. Both January and February average just as many rainy days as snowy days – roughly two days of each.

A brief history of Russian attack

Since the invasion began in February 2022, Russia made most of its gains in the first month of the war when it seized Kherson, surrounded Mariupol, and was on the doorsteps of Kyiv and Kharkiv.

But Russia soon gave up on Kyiv and withdrew all its forces from the north.

Failing to achieve quick victory, Russia instead settled on making incremental gains in the east and south. Over the next five months, Russia captured Mariupol, but little else of tactical or strategic value.

During this time, Ukraine built up its combat power with new weaponry from the West and planned a large counteroffensive, which it initiated on Aug. 28, 2022.

In the first week of the counteroffensive, Ukraine liberated more territory than Russia had captured in the previous five months.

The success of the counteroffensive showed that Ukraine’s military was superior to Russia’s in every category with the exception of size. It had better doctrine, leaders, strategy, culture and will – and it had just proved that it could effectively fight battles with a combination of artillery, tanks, soldiers and air attacks.

By Sept. 12, 2022, Ukraine had liberated much of Kharkiv Oblast as Russian troops routinely fled from their positions.

After liberating the entirety of Kharkiv Oblast in early October 2022, Ukraine turned its attention to Kherson in the south. This was a different fight, and in some ways Ukraine’s military followed Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu’s axiom of “winning without fighting.”

The Ukrainians were able to conquer much of the territory without using many troops on the ground.

Instead, Ukraine used long-range rockets supplied by the U.S. and NATO allies to bombard Russian bases and supply lines that were previously unreachable. These attacks left Russian forces west of the Dnipro River in an untenable position.

Realizing this, Russia shockingly announced on Nov. 9, 2022, that it was withdrawing from Kherson. Two days later, Russia had completed its withdrawal from the west bank of the river.

What to expect from Russia

Over the course of the war, Russia has demonstrated little ability to conduct effective combat operations. This is not something that Russia can change overnight or over the course of the winter.

Russia’s best forces have been decimated throughout the conflict, and it is now increasingly relying on untrained conscripts.

Likewise, Russia is exhausting much of its weaponry as international sanctions against them are limiting Russia’s wartime production. Aside from Iran, few nations are providing military aid to Russia.

Russia’s military is now less trained, has lower morale, and has significantly fewer weapons and less ammunition than it had at the beginning of the current war.

As a result, Russia lacks the ability to conduct large-scale attacks, and it is left with little option but to continue what it has been doing: conducting missile strikes against targets that are either defenseless or offer little strategic value.

Limiting Russia’s options further, these strikes have been less effective as the war has progressed.

Early in the war, most of Russia’s missiles made it through Ukraine’s limited air defenses. With the help of western air defense systems, Ukraine was shooting down 50% of Russian missiles in October and is now intercepting over 80% of them.

Winter should not affect these types of combat operations.

But snow will have an impact on Russia’s already stressed and underperforming logistical system, and the cold will further lower – if that is possible – the already low morale of Russia’s poorly outfitted and undertrained soldiers.

What to expect from Ukraine

As the smaller military, Ukraine cannot afford to take heavy losses.

Thus far, it has used a strategy of defending territory when it could, retreating when it should to preserve combat power, and attacking when the opportunities have presented themselves.

Ukraine effectively employed this strategy to defend Kyiv in the first month of the war and during the September 2022 counteroffensive to reclaim the Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts.

An important question must be asked. Why did it take six months for Ukraine to launch its counteroffensive?

One reason is that Ukraine had to wait several months for promised Western aid to arrive at its bases. In my view, a significant factor is the lengthy amount of time it takes to plan large counteroffensives and to position supplies, equipment and forces.

The fact that Ukraine conducted the counterattacks in succession suggests that Ukraine lacks the combat power to conduct two large-scale counterattacks at the same time.

Ukraine is going to need time to regroup, refit and plan for its next large-scale operation.

Thus, it seems reasonable that Ukraine will have to wait at least 30 to 45 days – maybe more – before it is ready to execute its next counteroffensive, which would be in the heart of winter.

While conducting an attack in winter may be difficult, off-road movement in the spring could become impossible, as the Russians discovered during their initial invasion in muddy and wet terrain.

It seems reasonable to conclude that Ukraine may wish to initiate its next counteroffensive while the ground is still frozen – and Russian troop morale is at its lowest point since the invasion.

About the Author:

Liam Collins, Founding Director, Modern War Institute, United States Military Academy West Point

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Source: Streetwise Reports  (12/5/22)

With inflation on the rise, investor attention has shifted to more tangible assets such as zinc-lead. With a positive relationship with locals and good ESG, Slave Lake Zinc Corp. may be one company you want to add to your radar.

Slave Lake’s name comes from the lake itself, and the company’s large claim lies somewhat south of this eponymous feature of the northern Canadian landscape.

The claim is in an area briefly mined for lead and zinc at the end of the second world war, but the owners at the time halted production after the market for the metals cratered in the 1950s.

American Yellowknife Mines, which operated the mine then, identified 67,950 tons grading 7.64% Zinc, 3.12% lead, 0.13% copper, and 8.22 grams per tonne (8.22 g/pt) silver near the Shaft Zone, an area that includes a headframe and underground drifting of over 400 meters into various smaller pits.

This zone includes drilling down to 200 meters, with complete mineralization found the whole way down. Samples from the pits contained 10% to 27% zinc plus lead. The existing 55-meter deep three-compartment shaft has a drift station at 45 meters providing access to a seam assayed at 55% lead, 13.5% zinc, and 84.4 g/t silver.

The Catalyst: Zinc Growing in Popularity

Unlike in the 1950s, zinc is now a money metal. It’s used to make pennies, is an important element of nutrition, and is a prime candidate to replace lithium in batteries as part of the green revolution.

Technical analyst Clive Maund opined that “with the company looking set to move forward, the move looks like the beginning of a new uptrend following the tedious downtrend from the highs of last April, and it is viewed as a speculative Buy here.”

Of course, these uses are all somewhat niche compared to the metal’s primary industrial use in the galvanization process. Zinc is important enough that governments in both the U.S. and Canada designate it as a critical material.

Currently, Slave Lake is fully permitted with a has a Type A Land Use permit and Type B Water license to have a 49-person, 3-drill operation to begin with, which allows it to move forward immediately, further de-risking the company’s plans moving forward. Funding-dependent, the company could potentially start drilling tomorrow.

However, as it stands, Slave Lake Zinc Corp. is not producing any materials for sale.

Instead, the company is continuing to expand its claim as it does further geological work to map out the footprint of a large, high-quality hydrothermal formation.

“At this stage, we are highly focused on diminishing risk,” explained Slave Lake Zinc Corp.’s CEO, Ritch Wigham. He’s recently overseen the company’s expansion from a 600-acre claim to one that’s over 18,000 acres or 76.25 sqkm and has been busy acquiring permits and developing a strong “right of first refusal” working relationship with members of the local community.

Positive Relationships and ESG

Slave Lake Zinc Corp. is one of only two companies that have successfully negotiated the multi-year, international process required to allow tribal lands in Canada to revert to Crown ownership and be claimed by commercial producers.

“We can confirm that Slave Lake Zinc and the NWTMN have a positive working relationship, as provided for in the Collaboration Agreement between the NWTMN and Slave Lake Zinc,” explained Dr. Ronald Yaworsky of KHL Consulting, speaking on behalf of the nation itself. “Slave Lake Zinc has been respectful and proactive in [its] engagement

In addition to the considerable goodwill and rich in-ground reserves he has ferreted out, Wigham says the claim’s close proximity (about 37 miles) to the Taltson hydroelectric plant will allow for an ESG-forward, hydrocarbon-free operation once the mine is up and running.

Wigham’s strategy is to continue building the claim’s value by mitigating the risks any processor would face when taking on the site and ramping up to full production.

As it currently stands, Slave Lake Zinc Corp. is a basic buy-and-hold play for those interested in buying unexploited base metal reserves to hedge against either inflation or an equities market downturn. The company plans to start a comprehensive drilling program early next year to quantify in-ground reserves better and explore claim expansion opportunities.

On November 9, 2022, technical analyst Clive Maund opined that “with the company looking set to move forward, the move [up on Nov 8th, 2022] looks like the beginning of a new uptrend following the tedious downtrend from the highs of last April, and it is viewed as a speculative Buy here, and especially on any near-term dips.”

Ownership, Coverage, and Share Structure

Company management owns approximately 20.8 million shares — 40% of outstanding shares, or 27% on a fully diluted basis. There are no institutional investors on record, and all of the outstanding stock is retail except for the CA$150,000.00 balance of the debenture outstanding.

Technical analyst Clive Maund of Clivemaund.com follows this stock. Click See More Live Data” to view more of what he is saying.

The company has roughly CA$300,000 in the bank and is burning CA$25,000/month at current operating levels.

Slave Lake also has 6,652,000 options in the CA$0.10 to CA$0.15 price range expiring between Feb 22, 2023, and Nov 7, 2024, as well as 16,095,000 warrants ranging from CA$0.15 to CA$0.18 expiring between March 25, 2023, and Feb 18, 2025.

An additional CA$150,000 in CA$0.08 convertible debenture financing adds another 1,875,000 potential claims. The total outstanding fully diluted share count is 76,131,500.

Slave Lake Zinc Corp. has a market cap of around US$3.153 million, with 51,509,500 shares outstanding, and it trades in the 52-week range of US$0.0115 and US$0.1429.

Disclosures:
1) Owen Ferguson wrote this article for Streetwise Reports LLC and provides services to Streetwise Reports as an independent contractor. He or members of his household own securities of the following companies mentioned in the article: None. He or members of his household are paid by the following companies mentioned in this article: None.

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