InvestMacro

By Paul Mwebaze, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 

Drive through the plains of Iowa or Kansas and you’ll see more than rows of corn, wheat and soybeans. You’ll also see towering wind turbines spinning above fields and solar panels shining in the sun on barns and machine sheds.

For many farmers, these are lifelines. Renewable energy provides steady income and affordable power, helping farms stay viable when crop prices fall or drought strikes.

But some of that opportunity is now at risk as the Trump administration cuts federal support for renewable energy.

Wind power brings steady income for farms

Wind energy is a significant economic driver in rural America. In Iowa, for example, over 60% of the state’s electricity came from wind energy in 2024, and the state is a hub for wind turbine manufacturing and maintenance jobs.

For landowners, wind turbines often mean stable lease payments. Those historically were around US$3,000 to $5,000 per turbine per year, with some modern agreements $5,000 to $10,000 annually, secured through 20- to 30-year contracts.

Nationwide, wind and solar projects contribute about $3.5 billion annually in combined lease payments and state and local taxes, more than a third of it going directly to rural landowners.

These figures are backed by long-term contracts and multibillion‑dollar annual contributions, reinforcing the economic value that turbines bring to rural landowners and communities.

Wind farms also contribute to local tax revenues that help fund rural schools, roads and emergency services. In counties across Texas, wind energy has become one of the most significant contributors to local property tax bases, stabilizing community budgets and helping pay for public services as agricultural commodity revenues fluctuate.

In Oldham County in northwest Texas, for example, clean energy projects provided 22% of total county revenues in 2021. In several other rural counties, wind farms rank among the top 10 property taxpayers, contributing between 38% and 69% of tax revenue.

The construction and operation of these projects also bring local jobs in trucking, concrete work and electrical services, boosting small-town businesses.

The U.S. wind industry supports over 300,000 U.S. jobs across construction, manufacturing, operations and other roles connected to the industry, according to the American Clean Power Association.

Renewable energy has been widely expected to continue to grow along with rising energy demand. In 2024, 93% of all new electricity generating capacity was wind, solar or energy storage, and the U.S. Energy Information Administration expected a similar percentage in 2025 as of June.

Solar can cut power costs on the farm

Solar energy is also boosting farm finances. Farmers use rooftop panels on barns and ground-mounted systems to power irrigation pumps, grain dryers and cold storage facilities, cutting their power costs.

Some farmers have adopted agrivoltaics – dual-use systems that grow crops beneath solar panels. The panels provide shade, helping conserve water, while creating a second income path. These projects often cultivate pollinator-friendly plants, vegetables such as lettuce and spinach, or even grasses for grazing sheep, making the land productive for both food and energy.

Federal grants and tax credits that were significantly expanded under the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act helped make the upfront costs of solar installations affordable.

However, the federal spending bill signed by President Donald Trump on July 4, 2025, rolled back many clean energy incentives. It phases down tax credits for distributed solar projects, particularly those under 1 megawatt, which include many farm‑scale installations, and sunsets them entirely by 2028. It also eliminates bonus credits that previously supported rural and low‑income areas.

Without these credits, the upfront cost of solar power could be out of reach for some farmers, leaving them paying higher energy costs. At a 2024 conference organized by the Institute of Sustainability, Energy and Environment at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, where I work as a research economist, farmers emphasized the importance of tax credits and other economic incentives to offset the upfront cost of solar power systems.

What’s being lost

The cuts to federal incentives include terminating the Production Tax Credit for new projects placed in service after Dec. 31, 2027, unless construction begins by July 4, 2026, and is completed within a tight time frame. The tax credit pays eligible wind and solar facilities approximately 2.75 cents per kilowatt-hour over 10 years, effectively lowering the cost of renewable energy generation. Ending that tax credit will likely increase the cost of production, potentially leading to higher electricity prices for consumers and fewer new projects coming online.

The changes also accelerate the phase‑out of wind power tax credits. Projects must now begin construction by July 4, 2026, or be in service before the end of 2027 to qualify for any credit.

Meanwhile, the Investment Tax Credit, which covers 30% of installed cost for solar and other renewables, faces similar limits: Projects must begin by July 4, 2026, and be completed by the end of 2027 to claim the credits. The bill also cuts bonuses for domestic components and installations in rural or low‑income locations. These adjustments could slow new renewable energy development, particularly smaller projects that directly benefit rural communities.

While many existing clean energy agreements will remain in place for now, the rollback of federal incentives threatens future projects and could limit new income streams. It also affects manufacturing and jobs in those industries, which some rural communities rely on.

Renewable energy also powers rural economies

Renewable energy benefits entire communities, not just individual farmers.

Wind and solar projects contribute millions of dollars in tax revenue. For example, in Howard County, Iowa, wind turbines generated $2.7 million in property tax revenue in 2024, accounting for 14.5% of the county’s total budget and helping fund rural schools, public safety and road improvements.

In some rural counties, clean energy is the largest new source of economic activity, helping stabilize local economies otherwise reliant on agriculture’s unpredictable income streams. These projects also support rural manufacturing – such as Iowa turbine blade factories like TPI Composites, which just reopened its plant in Newton, and Siemens Gamesa in Fort Madison, which supply blades for GE and Siemens turbines. The tax benefits in the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act helped boost those industries – and the jobs and local tax revenue they bring in.

On the solar side, rural companies like APA Solar Racking, based in Ohio, manufacture steel racking systems for utility-scale solar farms across the Midwest.

As rural America faces economic uncertainty and climate pressures, I believe homegrown renewable energy offers a practical path forward. Wind and solar aren’t just fueling the grid; they’re helping keep farms and rural towns alive.

About the Author:

Paul Mwebaze, Research Economist at the Institute for Sustainability, Energy and Environment, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

By Jabulani Shaba, University of Groningen 

Zimbabwe has the largest lithium reserves on the African continent. Lithium has been mined since the colonial period in the 1950s. It’s a critical part of rechargeable lithium-ion batteries that are essential for the electric vehicle industry. Globally, the lithium-ion battery market is worth US$78.9 billion and is likely to amount to US$349.6 billion by 2034.

In 2021, there was a new lithium rush in Zimbabwe because of increased global demand for the mineral. Today, most of Zimbabwe’s lithium mines are owned by Chinese mining companies like Sinomine, Zhejiang Huayo Cobalt, Chengxin Lithium, Yahua and Canmax.

Lithium-ion batteries aren’t made in Zimbabwe. Instead, the country exports the mineral as a raw resource. Much of the value of Zimbabwe’s lithium – 480,000 metric tonnes mined since 2015 – is reaped by companies in China which make the raw lithium into batteries and other goods.

During the lithium rush, artisanal miners were involved in the lithium industry. They mined and sold raw ore. But their participation has recently slowed down because artisanal lithium mining is largely illegal. For this reason, official data reports haven’t been able to record how much lithium has been mined this way.

In 2022, the Zimbabwean government banned the export of raw lithium ore in an attempt to regulate the industry and curb artisanal lithium mining and illicit exports.

However, it was still permitted to export lithium concentrate (a powdered version of the raw mineral). But the government recently decided to ban the export of lithium concentrate from January 2027. It says the ban will improve the country’s efforts towards building facilities that add value to lithium, such as lithium refineries and battery production plants.

I research resource extraction and environmental change caused by mining in southern Africa.

If properly implemented and regulated, the new ban on exporting lithium concentrate could increase Zimbabwe’s self-sufficiency in lithium processing. It could even help the country achieve the middle-income economy it has set out in its Vision 2030, in which it aims to have a mining industry that generates US$12 billion a year in revenue. Zimbabwe has the world’s second largest reserves of platinum and huge supplies of chrome. Making goods locally from lithium would expand the mineral export revenue in addition to platinum and chrome.

However, becoming a middle-income nation is currently hampered by mining revenue leaking away – through losses from smuggling, tax evasion and others.

Also, environmental justice groups estimate that about 3,000 tonnes of raw lithium leaves the country daily. Between now and the time the 2027 ban on exporting lithium concentrate comes into effect, about 1.6 million additional tonnes of raw lithium could have been extracted and sent overseas. This means the government should not wait for 2027, but should implement the ban on lithium concentrate exports now.

The ban also doesn’t seem to be aimed at uplifting the livelihoods of communities who live near lithium mines. I describe these communities as living in sacrifice zones: they bear the brunt of lithium mining pollution and land grabs for mines. These vulnerable groups include women, children and artisanal lithium miners who have been disempowered by the just transition.

To use its lithium reserves to uplift the country, the government of Zimbabwe needs to establish local plans that place community development and improved livelihood of mining communities at the centre of mining. This could be done through pro-poor development policies that will create employment opportunities for local people in lithium mining frontiers. It could also include compelling mines to purchase locally made goods and fresh produce. Bringing artisanal miners into local value chains in gold, diamond and chrome mining would also help these informal miners become part of the formal mining economy.

The politics of lithium mining in Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe is one of the 10 biggest global lithium exporters (Chile, Argentina and Australia are others). In the first nine months of 2023 alone, it is estimated that about US$209 million worth of Zimbabwean lithium was sold.

The potential of lithium to stimulate economic development and attract international investments is unquestionable. The problem, however, over the last few years seems to be that the market isn’t regulated enough. Lithium mining has not created many jobs, and for the few that are employed, there’ve been gross human rights abuses, wage cuts, and a lack of investment in road infrastructure.

The politics of lithium mining are also shaped by networks of political elites. They are known as the lithium barons: people who engage in corrupt deals and smuggling.

Another problem has been the misplaced focus on artisanal miners. For example, the 2022 lithium ban mainly targeted artisanal lithium miners who were on the margins of the industry. It did not affect large-scale mining companies to the same extent. When the lithium ban was introduced, the market for processed lithium expanded and the demand for unprocessed lithium drastically shrank. This left artisanal miners with raw lithium and a shrinking market price.

What needs to happen next

Between now and 2027, lithium mining companies in Zimbabwe will try to extract as much lithium as possible before the ban comes into effect. This could deplete the lithium reserves in the country. Mining investors might look elsewhere.

The Zimbabwean government should take these steps to solve the problem:

1) The Zimbabwe government must ensure total monopoly of its lithium reserves. The over-reliance on Chinese investments in the lithium industry has set a bad precedent for what might happen with other minerals in future. It will take time for the government to undo this and set up its own monopoly. This resource sovereignty will be vital.

2) The government must consider how to govern minerals in a people-centred way. So far, lithium has not benefited ordinary Zimbabweans.

3) The resource communities where extraction deals are taking place must be consulted and brought into the conversation about how Zimbabwe can benefit from its lithium reserves. Communities in Zimbabwe like Buhera, Bikita, Mberengwa and Goromonzi have endured years of lithium mining pollution.

This includes their freshwater sources being contaminated by mines, toxic dust from blasting, mineworkers being exposed to hazardous and unsafe working conditions, displacement, and above all gross human rights abuses from multinational lithium mining companies.

4) The ban on the exports of lithium concentrates is crucial for stimulating local beneficiation and value addition. The government should implement this ban immediately rather than waiting for the 2027 timeline.

About the Author:

Jabulani Shaba, Postdoctoral researcher, University of Groningen

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Global energy markets, such as those for oil, gas and coal, tend to be sensitive to a wide range of world events – especially when there is some sort of crisis. Having worked in the energy industry for over 30 years, I’ve seen how war, political instability, pandemics and economic sanctions can significantly disrupt energy markets and impede them from functioning efficiently.

A look at the basics

First, consider the economic fundamentals of supply and demand. The risk most people imagine in the current crisis between Israel, the U.S. and Iran is that Iran, which is itself a major oil-producing country, might suddenly expand the conflict by threatening the ability of neighboring countries to supply oil to the world.

Oil wells, refineries, pipelines and shipping lanes are the backbone of energy markets. They can be vulnerable during a crisis: Whether there is deliberate sabotage or collateral damage from military action, energy infrastructure often takes a hit.

For instance, after Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in August 1990, Iraqi forces placed explosive charges on Kuwaiti oil wells and began detonating them in January 1991. It took months for all the resulting fires to be put out, and millions of barrels of oil and hundreds of millions of cubic meters of natural gas were released into the environment – rather than being sold and used productively somewhere around the world.

Logistics can mess markets up too. For instance, closing critical maritime routes like the Strait of Hormuz or the Suez Canal can cause transportation delays.

Whether supply is lost from decreased production or blocked transportation routes, the effect is less oil available to the market, which not only causes prices to rise in general, but it also makes them more volatile – tending to change more frequently and by larger amounts.

On the flip side, demand can also shift radically. During the 1990-1991 Gulf War, demand rose: U.S. forces alone used more than 2 billion gallons of fuel, according to an Army analysis. By contrast, during the COVID-19 pandemic, industries shut down, travel came to a halt and energy demand plummeted.

When crisis looms, countries and companies often start stockpiling oil and other raw materials rather than buying only what they need right now. That creates even more imbalance, resulting in price volatility that leaves everyone, both consumers and producers, with a headache.

Regional considerations

In addition to uncertainties around market fundamentals, it’s important to note that many of the world’s energy reserves are located in regions that have not been models of stability. In the Middle East, wars, revolutions and diplomatic disputes there can raise concerns about supply, demand or both.

Those worries send shock waves through the world’s energy markets. It’s like walking on a tightrope: One wrong move – or even the perception of a misstep – can make the market wobble.

Governments’ economic sanctions, such as those restricting trade with Iran, Russia or Venezuela, can distort production and investment decisions and disrupt trade flows. Sometimes markets react even before sanctions are officially in place: Just the rumor of a possible embargo can cause prices to spike as buyers scramble to secure resources.

In 2008, for example, India and Vietnam imposed rice export bans, and rumors of additional restrictions fueled panic buying and nearly doubled prices in months.

In those scrambles, the role of investor speculation enters the picture. Energy commodities, such as oil and gas, aren’t just physical resources; they’re also traded as financial assets like stocks and bonds. During uncertain times, traders don’t wait around for actual changes in supply and demand. They react to news and forecasts, sometimes in large groups, which can shift the market just with the actions that result from their fears or hopes.

The events on June 22, 2025, are a good example of how this dynamic works. The Iranian parliament passed a resolution authorizing the country’s Supreme Council to close the Strait of Hormuz. Immediately, oil prices started rising, even though the strait was still open, with oil tankers steaming through unimpeded.

The next day, Iran launched a missile strike on Qatar, but coordinated in advance with Qatari officials to minimize damage and casualties. Traders and analysts perceived the action as a de-escalatory signal and anticipated that the Supreme Council was not going to close the strait. So prices started to fall.

It was a price roller coaster, fueled by speculation rather than reality. And computer algorithms and artificial intelligence, which assist in making automated trades, only add to the chaos of price changes.

A broader look

International crises can also cause wider changes in countries’ economies – or the global economy as a whole – which in turn affect the energy market.

If a crisis sparks a recession, rising inflation or high unemployment, those tend to cause people and businesses to use less energy. When the underlying situation stabilizes, recovery efforts can mean energy consumption resumes. But it’s like a pendulum swinging back and forth, with energy markets caught in the middle.

Renewable energy is not immune to international crisis and chaos. The supply is less affected by market forces: The amount of available sunlight and wind isn’t tied to geopolitical relations. But overall economic conditions still affect demand, and a crisis can disrupt the supply chains for the equipment needed to harness renewable energy, like solar panels and wind turbines.

It’s no wonder energy markets are so jittery during international crises. A mix of imbalances between supply and demand, vulnerable infrastructure, political tensions, corporate worries and speculative trading all weave together into a complex web of volatility.

For policymakers, investors and consumers, understanding these dynamics is key to navigating the ups and downs of energy markets in a crisis-prone world. The solutions aren’t simple, but being informed is the first step toward stability.

About the Author:

Skip York, Nonresident Fellow in Energy and Global Oil, Baker Institute for Public Policy, Rice University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

By Ari Peskoe, Harvard University and Eliza Martin, Harvard University 

In the race to develop artificial intelligence, large technology companies such as Google and Meta are trying to secure massive amounts of electricity to power new data centers. Electric utilities see the prospect of earning large profits by providing electricity to these power-hungry facilities and are competing for their business by offering discounts not available to average consumers.

In our paper Extracting Profits from the Public, we explain how utilities are forcing regular ratepayers to pay for the discounts enjoyed by some of the nation’s largest companies and identify ways policymakers can limit the costs to the public.

Shifting costs

In much of the U.S., utilities are monopolists. Within their service territories, they are the only companies allowed to deliver electricity to consumers. To fund their operations, utilities split the costs of maintaining and expanding their systems among all ratepayers – homeowners, businesses, warehouses, factories and anyone else who uses electricity.

Historically, a utility expanded its system to meet growing demand for electricity from new factories, businesses and homes. To pay for its expansion − new power plants, new transmission lines and other equipment − the utility would propose to raise electricity rates by different amounts for various types of consumers.

Public utility commissions are state agencies charged with ensuring that the public gets a fair deal. These commissions monitor how much money the utility spends to provide electric service and how its costs are shared among various types of ratepayers, including residential, commercial and industrial consumers. Ultimately, the public utility commission is supposed to approve any rate increases based on its assessment of what’s fair to consumers.

Splitting the utility’s costs among all consumers made perfect sense when population growth and economic development across the economy stimulated the need for new infrastructure. But today, in many utility service territories, most of the projected growth in electricity demand is due to new data centers.

Here’s the problem for consumers: To meet data center demand, utilities are building new power plants and power lines that are needed only because of data center growth. If state regulators allow utilities to follow the standard approach of splitting the costs of new infrastructure among all consumers, the public will end up paying to supply data centers with all that power.

A big price tag

One particularly acute example is in Louisiana. A Meta data center under development in the northeastern corner of the state is projected to use, by our calculations, twice as much energy as the city of New Orleans.

Entergy, the regional monopoly utility, is proposing to build more than US$3 billion worth of new gas-fired power plants and delivery infrastructure to meet the data center’s energy demand. Rather than billing Meta directly for these costs, Entergy is proposing to include the costs in rates paid by all customers.

Entergy claims its contract with Meta will cover some portion of the $3 billion price tag and that will mitigate any increases in consumers’ bills. But Entergy has asked state regulators to keep key terms of the contract secret, and only a redacted version of its application is available online.

The public has no idea how much it might pay if the commission approves the contract. And if the Meta data center ends up using much less power than the company anticipates, the public does not know whether it would be on the hook to pay higher electricity rates for longer periods to guarantee Entergy a profit.

Secret agreements

Our research, reviewing nearly 50 public utility commission proceedings about data centers’ power needs across 10 states, uncovered dozens of secretive contracts between utilities and data centers. Unlike Louisiana, most states require utilities to submit to the public utility commission their one-off deals with data centers, but they allow utilities to conceal the pricing terms from the public.

In normal rate-review cases, numerous parties advocate for their interests in a public proceeding, including members of the public, industry groups and the utility itself. But as our paper finds, utility commission reviews of data center contracts are based on confidential utility filings that are inaccessible to the general public. Few, if any, outsiders participate, and as a result the commission often hears only the utility’s version of the deal.

Because the pricing terms are secret, it is impossible to know whether the deal that a utility is offering to a data center is too low to cover the utility’s costs of providing power to the data center, which would mean that the public is subsidizing the deal. History shows, however, that utilities have a long history of exploiting their monopolies to shift costs to the public, including through secret contracts.

Other public costs

Our paper also explores other ways that the public pays for data center energy costs. For instance, many high-voltage interstate transmission projects, which connect large power plants to local delivery systems, are developed through regional planning processes run by numerous utilities. These alliances have complex rules for splitting the costs of new transmission lines and equipment among their utility members.

Once a utility is charged its share, it spreads the costs of new transmission projects among its local ratepayers. Because some regions are building new transmission capacity to accommodate data centers, our analysis finds that the public has been forced to pay billions of dollars for data center growth.

Data center energy costs can also be shifted when data centers connect directly to existing power plants. Under what are called “co-location” deals, the power plant stops selling energy to the wider public and just sells to the data center. With less supply in the overall market, prices go up and the public faces higher bills as a result.

Many state legislatures are noticing these problems and working to figure out how to address them. Several recent bills would set new terms and conditions for future data center deals that could help protect the public from data center energy costs.

About the Author:

Ari Peskoe, Lecturer on Law, Harvard University and Eliza Martin, Legal Fellow, Environmental and Energy Law Program, Harvard University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

By Terence Musho, West Virginia University 

When the computer or phone you’re using right now blinks its last blink and you drop it off for recycling, do you know what happens?

At the recycling center, powerful magnets will pull out steel. Spinning drums will toss aluminum into bins. Copper wires will get neatly bundled up for resale. But as the conveyor belt keeps rolling, tiny specks of valuable, lesser-known materials such as gallium, indium and tantalum will be left behind.

Those tiny specks are critical materials. They’re essential for building new technology, and they’re in short supply in the U.S. They could be reused, but there’s a problem: Current recycling methods make recovering critical minerals from e-waste too costly or hazardous, so many recyclers simply skip them.

Sadly, most of these hard-to-recycle materials end up buried in landfills or get mixed into products like cement. But it doesn’t have to be this way. New technology is starting to make a difference.

As demand for these critical materials keeps growing, discarded electronics can become valuable resources. My colleagues and I at West Virginia University are developing a new technology to change how we recycle. Instead of using toxic chemicals, our approach uses electricity, making it safer, cleaner and more affordable to recover critical materials from electronics.

How much e-waste are we talking about?

Americans generated about 2.7 million tons of electronic waste in 2018, according to the latest federal data. Including uncounted electronics, a survey by the United Nations suggests that the U.S. recycles only about 15% of its total e-waste.

Even worse, nearly half the electronics that people in Northern America sent to recycling centers end up shipped overseas. They often land in scrapyards, where workers may use dangerous methods like burning or leaching using harsh chemicals to pull out valuable metals. These practices can harm both the environment and workers’ health. That’s why the Environmental Protection Agency restricts these methods in the U.S.

The tiny specks matter

Critical minerals are in most of the technology around you. Every phone screen has a super-thin layer of a material called indium tin oxide. LEDs glow because of a metal called gallium. Tantalum stores energy in tiny electronic parts called capacitors.

All of these materials are flagged as “high risk” on the U.S. Department of Energy’s critical materials list. That means the U.S. relies heavily on these materials for important technologies, but their supply could be easily disrupted by conflicts, trade disputes or shortages.

Right now, just a few countries, including China, control most of the mining, processing and recovery of these materials, making the U.S. vulnerable if those countries decide to limit exports or raise prices.

These materials aren’t cheap, either. For example, the U.S. Geological Survey reports that gallium was priced between US$220 to $500 per kilogram in 2024. That’s 50 times more expensive than common metals like copper, at $9.48 per kilogram in 2024.

Revolutionizing recycling with microwaves

At West Virginia University’s Department of Mechanical, Materials and Aerospace Engineering, I and materials scientist Edward Sabolsky asked a simple question: Could we find a way to heat only specific parts of electronic waste to recover these valuable materials?

If we could focus the heat on just the tiny specks of critical minerals, we might be able to recycle them easily and efficiently.

The solution we found: microwaves.

This equipment isn’t very different from the microwave ovens you use to heat food at home, just bigger and more powerful. The basic science is the same – electromagnetic waves cause electrons to oscillate, creating heat.

In our approach, though, we’re not heating water molecules like you do when cooking. Instead, we heat carbon, the black residue that collects around a candle flame or car tailpipe. Carbon heats up much faster in a microwave than water does. But don’t try this at home; your kitchen microwave wasn’t designed for such high temperatures.

In our recycling method, we first shred the electronic waste, mix it with materials called fluxes that trap impurities, and then heat the mixture with microwaves. The microwaves rapidly heat the carbon that comes from the plastics and adhesives in the e-waste. This causes the carbon to react with the tiny specks of critical materials. The result: a tiny piece of pure, sponge-like metal about the size of a grain of rice.

This metal can then be easily separated from leftover waste using filters.

So far, in our laboratory tests, we have successfully recovered about 80% of the gallium, indium and tantalum from e-waste, at purities between 95% and 97%. We have also demonstrated how it can be integrated with existing recycling processes.

Why the Department of Defense is interested

Our recycling technology got its start with help from a program funded by the Defense Department’s Advanced Research Projects Agency, or DARPA.

Many important technologies, from radar systems to nuclear reactors, depend on these special materials. While the Department of Defense uses less of them than the commercial market, they are a national security concern.

We’re planning to launch larger pilot projects next to test the method on smartphone circuit boards, LED lighting parts and server cards from data centers. These tests will help us fine-tune the design for a bigger system that can recycle tons of e-waste per hour instead of just a few pounds. That could mean producing up to 50 pounds of these critical minerals per hour from every ton of e-waste processed.

If the technology works as expected, we believe this approach could help meet the nation’s demand for critical materials.

How to make e-waste recycling common

One way e-waste recycling could become more common is if Congress held electronics companies responsible for recycling their products and recovering the critical materials inside. Closing loopholes that allow companies to ship e-waste overseas, instead of processing it safely in the U.S., could also help build a reserve of recovered critical minerals.

But the biggest change may come from simple economics. Once technology becomes available to recover these tiny but valuable specks of critical materials quickly and affordably, the U.S. can transform domestic recycling and take a big step toward solving its shortage of critical materials.

About the Author:

Terence Musho, Associate Professor of Engineering, West Virginia University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.